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Aftershock: Reflections on the Politics of Reconstruction
in Northern Gorkha

Rune Bennike

Many commentators have described
the aftermath of the 2015 earthquake in
Nepal either (1) through the notion that
‘nothing is going on’ in regards to postquake reconstruction; or (2) through a
celebration of grassroots resilience and urban
entrepreneurship in the face of disaster
and state neglect. In this article, I draw on
observations from Kutang and Nubri in the
mountains of northern Gorkha District to
argue that neither of these descriptions is fully
accurate. Even in this remote and inaccessible
area, much was being done in the aftermath
of disaster, and a great deal of this activity
diverges, in multiple ways, from the notions
of spontaneous egalitarianism that are often
associated with ‘resilience.’

the active positioning of new political players on
the local scene; and the economic inequalities
that can arise from unlucky positioning along
geological fault-lines, a recently booming
tourist economy, and the specificities of
the Nepali government’s post-disaster
compensation schemes. This article sketches
out the anatomy of disaster ‘aftershock’ as a
political environment rife with opportunity,
bias, and unintended consequences. As scholars
and interested observers of Nepal and the
Himalaya, we need to pay close attention to
this environment and its potentially unequal
outcomes that reverberate past this present
moment of taking stock.
Keywords: Nepal, earthquake, aftershock, reconstruction,
politics.

I describe the fraught politics involved in
distributing relief aid in a village where the local
government has been non-existent for years;
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Introduction
On April 25th 2015, an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the
Richter Scale shook the Himalaya. Over the following
months, the initial quake was followed by a range of
aftershocks that seemed never-ending, and which kept
many inhabitants of the region in a drawn-out state of
terror. Soon after the initial quake, international donors
pledged over $4 billion to be used for post-earthquake
reconstruction to the Nepalese government. Nonetheless,
‘reconstruction’ in the aftermath of this disaster has
extensively been characterized by notions of slowness and
inactivity. It took the government almost a year to begin
disbursing reconstruction funds in earnest; in fact, the distribution is still ongoing at the time of writing this article
(June 2017)—two years after the funds were pledged. In
the absence of swift action on the side of the government,
many commentators—journalists and academics alike—
describe the aftermath of the earthquake as either a state
of inactivity or a stage for grassroots resilience in the
face of disaster and state neglect. In this article, I draw on
observations from Kutang and Nubri, located in the mountains of northern Gorkha District1 (a mere 30 kilometers,
or 19 miles, from the epicenter of the first major earthquake) to argue that neither of these descriptions is fully
accurate. Even in this remote and inaccessible area, a great
deal was going on in the aftermath of disaster, and much
of this activity diverges, in multiple ways, from the notions
of spontaneous egalitarianism that are often associated
with ‘resilience.’
This article explores the anatomy of ‘aftershock’—as a
social and political phenomenon rather than a seismic one.
In the wake of disaster, as relief aid and reconstruction
funding has poured into Nepal, a multitude of political and
economic, as well as personal and social, transformations
are taking place. Following disasters in other times and
places, people often refer to this ‘aftershock’ as a ‘second
earthquake’ or a ‘tsunami after the tsunami.’ As such
expressions indicate, the magnitude of these post-disaster
changes is easily perceived as being on par with that of
the disaster itself. The aftershock speeds up, intensifies
and—sometimes—alters the existing social structures and
processes of change. To give one obvious example, after
seven years of political deadlock, the aftershock environment facilitated the making of a new, and controversial,
constitution for Nepal. This article addresses some of the
dynamics taking place in the aftershock through a range of
both firsthand observations and analyses of ongoing public
debates. As I illustrate, these dynamics move things around
in less predictable ways than what mainstream narratives
of post-disaster reconstruction tend to suggest.
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While ‘Nothing is Going On’: Public Debate and
Mainstream Approaches to Post-Disaster
Dominant discourses about disaster allows us to
believe that we understand what has happened
and what is to be done. Such intellectual and
moral entrapment obscures much of what actually takes place in the name of reconstruction.
(Simpson 2013: 267)
As one might expect, the earthquake sparked a lot of
debate among Nepal anthropologists—readers of this
journal—as well as other engaged intellectuals and journalists. Much of the debate was highly sensitive to the
complex processes that were continuously unfolding. We
were reminded of the fact that the earthquake was also
a ‘class-quake,’ generally hitting the poor (such as the
migrant workers living in unsafe hostels near the Gongabu
bus park in the northwestern outskirts of Kathmandu)
harder than the rich. We were also reminded of the various
sources and forms of resilience displayed in the aftermath
of disaster; the potential pitfalls in celebrating resilience in
the face of government neglect; and the difficult balancing
act involved in choosing whether to work with or around
the government in relief and reconstruction (Nelson 2015;
Leve 2015; Sander et al. 2015; Tamang 2015).
Despite these sensitivities, parts of the debate seemed
distinctly at odds with what I was seeing take place in
northern Gorkha. One of the things I found most striking was the persistent narrative that nothing, really,
was going on in Nepal in terms of reconstruction. For
instance, at the South Asia Conference at the University
of Wisconsin—Madison in October 2015 participants in
a roundtable discussion on the earthquake kept repeating the same laments that were prevalent in Nepali and
international news media that none of the over $4 billion
that international donors pledged to the Nepali state for
post-earthquake reconstruction had yet been distributed. While this was certainly true at the time and highly
problematic, many people seemed to equate this inactivity
on the side of formal, state-led reconstruction with a total
lack of reconstruction. Due to the very tangible, infrastructural challenges involved in getting assistance into the
area, northern Gorkha was often described as a place ‘not
yet reached’ by aid. There was some truth to this claim, of
course. The mountainous environment did provide major
obstacles to the distribution of relief materials. However,
this condition did not equate with inactivity and the lack
of reconstruction. In fact, in an area where the presence
of the state has always been rather thin, a combination
of local initiative and transnational non-state networks
had immediately been mobilized to raise funds for relief

and reconstruction outside the ambit of formal initiatives
led by government and international relief organizations.
Here, the reconstruction of houses was well underway
within weeks of the first quake.
The tendency to describe places like northern Gorkha in
terms of their inactivity—despite such reconstruction
initiatives—is telling. First, the diagnosis resonates eerily
with prevalent narratives that characterize the high
Himalaya in terms of its remoteness and developmental
backwardness (Hussain 2015; Pigg 1992). Second, it fits well
with mainstream approaches to post-disaster reconstruction that tend to operate on the basis of a simple cause
and effect relationship.2 This approach is clearly reflected
in the now globally standardized formats of the Post
Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) framework.3 Here, the
earthquake is the cause and its effects are summarized in
terms of ‘damages’ and ‘economic losses’ (GoN 2015). With
this simple formula, the effects of the 2015 Himalayan
earthquake can be counted and evaluated on exactly the
same basis as the Haiti earthquake or the Pakistan floods.
The framework of this formula thus speaks to a tabula rasa
imagination of disaster, where disasters wipe clean the
slate of society so that post-disaster interventions can
be planned in the same way whether they are operating
in the high Himalaya of Nepal or the Caribbean island of
Haiti. In fact, many of the international specialists who
began to stream into Nepal after the quake seemed to
be selected for the job specifically because of their past
experience in Haiti.
As in other post-disaster situations (Simpson and Serafini
2015: 17), the Nepal PDNA was an extremely rough and
hasty product. For instance, a friend and I were suddenly
invited into the World Bank office to comment on their
estimates for damage to the tourism sector based on our
severely limited experience working in Gorkha after the
earthquake. There were only a few days to the deadline
and the Bank needed to come up with some figures. The
ministries and international agencies involved in the PDNA
obviously did whatever they could to get the most accurate
estimates, but given the chaos of the aftermath and the
haste of the exercise (the PDNA needed to be incorporated
into an overdue financial bill to be passed by parliament),
the results seemed close to guesswork. Nevertheless, as
soon as the PDNA was released, it assumed the appearance
of a total analysis. In Simpson’s words, it ‘allows us to
believe that we understand what has happened and what
is to be done’ (Simpson 2013: 267, see also Simpson and
Serafini 2015). Hence, while the PDNA and mainstream
cause-and-effect approaches provide a convenient baseline
for the international relief industry, they obscure a good
deal of what is actually going on.

As a consequence, a multitude of less formalized initiatives, such as those in northern Gorkha, tend to either
disappear from view or, if they appear, be read through
the lens of grassroots resilience. However, as this article
describes, such initiatives do have consequences, and there
is a lot more to reconstruction and compensation than the
reestablishment of a status quo ex-ante or ‘building back
better’ than mainstream approaches to disaster relief seem
to indicate.4 What I suggest is that the aftershock moves
things around in much less predictable ways than what
is imagined here. Disasters do not provide clean slates.
They are substantially shaped in the image of the societies they impact. The aftershock interacts with past power
structures, but it does not necessarily replicate them in a
one-to-one fashion. Novel opportunities for fundraising
and the increasing inflow of resources following disaster
accelerates and intensifies ongoing processes of change
and may heighten the stakes of how political games play
out in existing social structures. In the aftershock, opportunities and misfortunes are created in a shifting playing
field of complex negotiations of position. The aftershock,
in other words, shakes things up in ways that cannot be
adequately articulated through mainstream notions of
disaster assessments, reconstruction or compensation.
A Note on Positionality
My starting point for writing this article is personal. It
had never crossed my mind that I would, suddenly, be
reflecting on disaster and doing research on post-disaster transformation. But I was in Kathmandu when the
earthquake hit. The stories that I tell in this article stem
from my experience of post-disaster from this highly-engaged position. Like many others, it took me a few days to
get my bearings, as I was thoroughly shaken and scared,
like everyone else. I needed to figure out what had happened and what was going on. Once my fears subsided,
I contacted some friends from my ongoing research on
tourism development in northern Gorkha. They were in
Kathmandu, and were already in full swing, calling friends
and relatives. In some places phone connections were
gone, in other places they had never been established,
but here and there, my friends were able to receive news
from the area. Working out of Sonam’s trekking agency,
we began collecting information more systematically.
Over the following six weeks, we worked closely together.
Realizing we had the best information about this remote
area available at the time, we created online spreadsheets
with organized and updated information about the seven
Village Development Committees (VDC) in the Manaslu
Conservation Area (MCA). Through our connections in
the area we tried to match local needs with the inflow of
HIMALAYA Volume 37, Number 2 | 57

aid, and when the major relief organization finally came
up to speed, almost a month after the first earthquake, we
handed over as much information as we possibly could.
What we are dealing with here is participant-observation
with a clear emphasis on participation. My academic reflections have mostly come later, after I returned from Nepal.
Since I left the country in early July 2015, I have been back
twice: for a two-week visit in January 2016 and a six-week
stay in November-December 2016. These visits have been
enlightening for the glimpses they have given me of the
aftershock as a continuously unfolding reality. In January
2015, Nepal’s new contentious constitution was passed, and
the country was still in the grip of the fuel blockade that
followed its promulgation. In November and December of
2015 public debate was filled with discussions about ‘tin
lakh’—the Nepal Reconstruction Authority’s promise to
provide Nrs. 300,000 to each household whose house was
fully damaged during the earthquake.
Each visit gave me a new perspective on what the
aftershock of disaster means. In my mind, however, the
aftershock remains confusing. I feel that what I’m writing
now might be countered, again, in a month or two; that
the aftershock continues its churning that creates new
forms of political potentiality past the present moment
of stocktaking. Thus, what I write here is more a critique
of false certainties and clear-cut causalities than an
assertion of a new argument set in stone. What I emphasize is the fluidity of the aftershock as a transformative
political-economic environment.
Relief and the Politics of Distribution: ‘It’s All Logistics’5
Disasters are made to appear as logistical problems
which demand intervention and legitimate trespass. (Simpson 2013: 266)
Post-disaster environments can produce a resource
bubble where the ‘need to spend’ and to display efficiency
to donors may easily override concerns with coordination, local ownership and genuine needs in the name of
relief (Stirrat 2006). In northern Gorkha, from early on
relief efforts were framed largely as a technical matter
and spoken about in terms of terrain, infrastructure and
the possible ‘throughput’ of resources. While these were
obvious and legitimate issues in a Himalayan environment, they largely overshadowed other social and political
concerns among many of the responding actors. Although
the past half century of Nepali history vividly attests to
the fact that ensuring a fair and productive distribution of
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foreign development resources is a massive challenge rife
with the potential for persistent unintended consequences
(Pigg 1992; 1993; Bista 1991; Fujikura 2001; Bennike 2015b),
in the aftershock of disaster all concerns with the issues of
‘giving’ seemed suddenly to have been swept away.6 The
urgency and moral imperatives of post-disaster humanism superimposed flat, universal notions of suffering (and
resilience) onto a political and social landscape that was, if
anything, even more complicated than before the quake.
Some twelve days after the first quake struck the
Himalaya, my friend Nyima had raised funds from a group
of German donors to bring relief materials to Bihi VDC and
to further assess the situation in the area. Bihi had never
been connected to the mobile phone networks, which span
most of the Budhi Gandaki river valley, and information
about the area’s state was sparse in Kathmandu. Hence, we
didn’t know what to expect as we boarded the helicopter
for Bihi, which was also Nyima’s home. The following six
days in the area were incredible instructive. We learned
a great deal about the discrepancies between the needs
of the area and the general post-disaster discourse in
Kathmandu, and about the fraught interface between relief
distribution and contentious local politics.7
At the time, tin roofing and the construction of semi-permanent housing was the main focus for most responding
relief agencies. References to the haunting images of
disaster victims in Haiti and elsewhere, living under
tattered tarps years after previous disasters, fueled this
discourse, and the upcoming monsoon provided a clear
sense of urgency. However, this articulation of ‘local needs’
was distinctly at odds with realities in northern Gorkha.
Constructed of local materials, wood and stacked stones
without mortar, the houses here were quickly rebuilt
through local initiatives. Little outside support was needed
for these rebuilding projects. Every village seemed to
have someone skilled enough to oversee the reconstruction. As we arrived in Bihi, a group of about ten men had
come together and were rebuilding damaged houses at
the rapid pace of two per day. CGI roofing was welcomed
as a replacement for worn-out or damaged roofs made
of wooden planks or slate, but it was not essential. Most
houses would be fit for habitation before the rains and
when I returned in 2016 many were indeed improved.
There were other issues, however. Although remote areas
are often regarded as places of subsistence livelihood, the
Manaslu area has historically been characterized by a high
degree of trade and mobility (Childs 2004). As the earthquake had provoked a number of major landslides, the

Figure 1. House under
reconstruction shortly after the
first major earthquake.
(Bennike, 2015)

trail that provides the lifeline to the area had been broken.
Foods usually brought from the bazaar in Arughat, which
is a three-day walk downstream, were in short supply. For
a while, people had stores of local foods (e.g. corn, barley,
millet, potatoes) on which to survive, but their stocks
of rice, lentils, salt, tea, and milk powder were quickly
depleted. Everything coming into the area had to be transported by helicopter, a process that was both costly and
inefficient. Hence, the priority for people in the area was
not the usual relief materials, but was in fact the reopening
of the trail.
The distribution of the relief materials that did trickle
into Bihi, loaded into small helicopters was a complicated
political affair. With local elections suspended for almost
two decades, no formally legitimate local bodies existed to
which to turn. In this vacuum, a local leader and former
VDC head had, it was persistently rumored, made Bihi into
his own little fiefdom, ‘eating’ development funding channeled through the state administration and controlling
local politics with a heavy hand. However, at the time of
the earthquake, he was hospitalized in Kathmandu and
thus out of touch with what was going on in Bihi. With no
formal structures of authority in place and the old leader
out of the village, the distribution of external resources for
relief called for local institutional innovation.
When we arrived, an ad hoc group of Bihi locals had
emerged to take charge. Formed partly by people opposed
to the old rule in the village, this group was something
new. For them, it seemed, the aftershock of the earthquake
provided an opportunity to show themselves as people

committed to the common good of the village. They threw
themselves with great energy at the complicated task of
fairly distributing meager rations of rice, lentils, biscuits,
noodles and tarps. The questions facing them, however,
were many and highly political. Were the materials to be
distributed uniformly across the local residents or on the
basis of their needs? Should households or individuals
be the basic unit for distribution? When was the right
time to begin distribution? And how could a fair distribution be ensured when resources arrived piecemeal, in
different localities across the VDC, and often without any
prior notice?
On distribution day, the complexity of their task was
vividly illustrated by a curious scene beginning with the
familiar humming sound of an approaching helicopter.
Just as the distribution was about to begin, the helicopter
swept into the village, blowing dust on the materials that
were laid out for distribution in front of the village mill. It
was the World Food Programme (WFP). Through a quick
succession of questions addressed to the people who had
gathered around him, the WFP representative ascertained
what seemed to be a foregone conclusion: that the agency
would supply large quantities of rice to the households
in the VDC. Five minutes later, they were gone again, but
the visit had palpably illustrated how the ever-uncertain
horizon of future relief arrivals complicated distribution.
Even though dealing with the influx of relief material
was a complicated political affair in the village, for the
WFP it was mainly a logistical matter. As one representative stated, ‘In Nepal, we are working in some of the
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Figure 2. Small measures
of dal handed out on
distribution day in Bihi.
(Bennike, 2015)

most difficult terrain in the world, and the challenge
will be compounded by the monsoon’ (Dixit 2015). Under
what became known as Operation Mountain Express, the
agency made an agreement with the Trekking Agencies
Association of Nepal and the Nepal Mountaineering
Association to hire up to 20,000 porters and mules in order
to ‘repair the damaged trails and transport 4,000 metric
tons (MT) of food and relief items.’8 The WFP and partners
approached this operation with clear professionalism; for
instance, employing a professional film crew to document
their work9 and producing a ‘subway map’ that specifies
‘staging areas,’ ‘transportations corridors’ and a ‘throughput’ measured in metric tons per month (MT/mth).
Nonetheless, the whole operation was framed exclusively
as a matter of most efficiently pouring resources into the
area across an incredibly challenging physical terrain;
all reflections about the complicated social, political and
economic landscapes into which these resources were
inserted seemed wiped away.
Apart from this disregard for the local complexities of
patronage politics, the operation held the potential for
unintended economic consequences. As part of the WFP
operations, the main trail through the Manaslu area was
surveyed by a Swiss/Nepali team some weeks after the
earthquake. The geologist’s conclusion was clear: the
main trail was situated on a fault line in the landscape
and highly prone to landslides. Subsequently, plans were
made for an alternative trail into the area that included
high paths on the other (eastern) side of the Budhi Gandaki
River. This trail would be much safer, and WFP set to work
developing the trail to a standard they could use for food
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distribution to the area. However, the choice of shifting
the trail—which was made with reference to logistics and
safety and pushed through under the urgency of post-disaster relief—held the potential for massive unintended
consequences in relation to the local economy. As an
up-and-coming tourist area, the Budhi Gandaki river valley
has seen rapid investment in tourism infrastructure over
the past 6-7 years. The realignment of the trail would
mean that a great deal of people who had spent all their
savings and taken loans to build tourist lodges on the
western side of the river in anticipation of a future rise in
tourism would now be by-passed. And with a government
compensation scheme purely focused on damaged houses,
the economic loss of these people was not accounted for.
For a while, it looked like this would be the consequence,
but by November 2016, the old trail was back in use. To the
relief of local small-scale tourism businesses, trekkers and
locals alike seemed to have deemed the safe, high trail too
cumbersome to use.
Reconstruction: Opportunities for Good Work
The emotive language of suffering, aid, and rehabilitation is generally difficult to argue with head on:
what could be wrong with ‘good work’? (Simpson
2013: 266)
The earthquake created new opportunities for fundraising
and opened up peripheral areas, such as northern Gorkha,
to a host of new organizations and an increased influx of
resources. Following the initial focus on logistics and relief,
the emphasis shifted to reconstruction. While the govern-

ment’s National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) moved
slowly towards the distribution of reconstruction funds
they were steeped in political infighting, and other organizations took the opportunity to scale up their operations
in northern Gorkha—among these Christian organizations such as World Vision, Christian Relief Services,
and Mountain Child. When I visited in November and
December 2016, the resource influx and need to spend was
tangible. Christian Relief Services tarps were piled high in
many houses; World Vision had just completed the distribution of Nrs. 45,000 in cash to each household throughout
the area; and Mountain Child had established a pre-school
in Samagaon and were working on the reconstruction of a
school in Ghap.
For these organizations, the earthquake had provided a
major opportunity. As the founder of MC candidly stated in
an appeal for funding shortly after the earthquake, the situation provided ‘an unprecedented opportunity to unfold
God’s pervasive grace upon areas that have only known
martyrdom in the past (…) now is the time to hoist the flag
of God’s kingdom at the top of the world.’10 It is hard to
foresee the consequences of such interweaving between
the urgencies of disaster reconstruction and Christian
proselytization among communities of Tibetan Buddhists,
but judging from other post-disaster contexts, they may be
both insidious and persistent (Simpson 2013; Simpson and
Serafini 2015: 16).
The influx of resources provided some local people with
new opportunities. The organizations that were scaling up
their operations needed new, local employees. Here, the
aftershock of disaster sped up existing processes of change.
Good language skills, especially in English, were already a
means to mobility among young people before the earthquake through employment as trekking guides, etc. After
the earthquake, many of these young people were now
offered positions as local ‘coordinators’ or ‘mobilizers’ in
various reconstruction projects. For some people, it was
suddenly possible to earn a decent wage for very little
work11 while staying in the village and only undertaking
occasional visits to Gorkha or Kathmandu to report or
participate in ‘training’ events. My friend, Nyima, who had
travelled with me to Bihi after the earthquake, maintained
connections to some German donors. Employed by the
new German-funded ‘Initiative Nepal Kids’ (INK), he is
now overseeing the construction of a school in Bihi and
splitting his time between Kathmandu and Bihi. Another
friend, Tashi, who went with me to Bihi in late 2016, had
just finished a temporary contract working for WV on
their cash distribution program. Tashi’s friend, Yeshe, who

we met en route, was working for a local NGO contracted by
CRS to do recovery and reconstruction work in the area.
All trained as trekking guides, these smart young boys had
found new opportunities in the aftershock.
Back in Bihi, the aftershock had also accelerated existing infrastructural developments. When I returned in
November 2016, changes were clearly visible. As many
locals told me, the village had become ‘bikasi’ (developed)
in the vary tangible ways that are often emphasized in
Nepali public discourse: the hydro-power supply that had
been damaged in the earthquake had been re-established,
providing a steady supply of power to the village; new
water taps had been installed in every ward and a toilet
built for every household; a new, big health post had been
established; and a school building, as well as a private
hotel, was under construction; last, but not least, a mobile
tower had been erected just after the earthquake so that
this part of the river valley was also, now, connected to
the outside world via cheap and accessible mobile phones.
Many of these development projects had been planned
well before the earthquake, but had suddenly been
accomplished in the rush of reconstruction work after the
earthquake. Furthermore, villagers themselves had privately chosen to utilize some of the cash distributed after
the earthquake to fly CGI sheets for roofing and toilets
in by helicopter and some were planning to spend the
expected government reconstruction funds to build small
‘home-stay’ houses for future tourist.
The aftershock also reverberated in local politics. One
villager, rumored to have been associated with the heavyhanded rule of the past, had emerged as the de-facto
leader of development initiatives in the village. He told me
how Bihi used to be regarded as a bad, less developed place
compared to most other villages in the area. Now, it was
going to be different. Things were changing in Bihi, and he
wanted it to be regarded as a ‘model VDC.’ Soon after the
earthquake when I visited the village with relief materials,
this individual had been leading the group of villagers that
went around to rebuild houses. Later, his skills had made
him a central person for the construction of the school in
collaboration with INK. He has a good command of Nepali
(in addition to the local dialects of Tibetan) and had converted to Christianity some years before the earthquake.
He was now the go-to person in the village for development. He was doing ‘good work.’ Some villagers, however,
were skeptical. The memories of the past were still fresh,
and they were waiting to see whether this man was as
good on the ‘inside’ as he expressed on the ‘outside’ at the
current moment.
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New opportunities emerged in Kathmandu, too. Sonam,
out of whose office we began coordinating relief to
northern Gorkha quickly after the disaster, is now heavily
involved in reconstruction work. Sometime after the
earthquake, he registered the relief network we had established as a fully-fledged NGO.12 While Sonam was already
running a successful trekking business before the earthquake, the aftershock has placed him in a unique position.
Educated as an emergency architect from a European
university, and with extensive experience in activism
for the protection of cultural heritage in the mountains,
Sonam has become a crucial figure for reconstruction
projects in northern Gorkha and beyond. In January
2016, his office was overseeing the reconstruction of six
schools and health posts northern Gorkha—some with full
responsibility, others on a consultancy basis. By November
2016, several additional projects had been included in
the portfolio. Sonam is now renting the office across the
hall from his trekking agency in Boudha for the NGO, and
overhead funds from the various projects have allowed
him to employ several friends as well as a few volunteer
interns. Throughout his work, Sonam has been struggling
against a persistent bias on the side of the government
to think of reconstruction solely in terms of reinforced
concrete buildings, (much like in post-earthquake Gujarat,
see Simpson and Serafini 2015). His design for the school in
Bihi is now presented as a model for earthquake resistant
reconstruction with local materials, but there were many
bureaucratic hassles to get there.
Reverberations
The small fragments of post-disaster experience described
in this article provide a glimpse into ‘aftershock’ as a
continuously evolving scenario. Far from the clear-cut
notions of cause and effect so fundamental to post-disaster
response, the aftershock is rife with opportunity, bias and
unintended consequences. As the aftershock continues to
reverberate in the political, economic and social fabrics
of Nepali society, no strict conclusions can be drawn from
the present moment. What is evident, however, is that
a whole lot of different things take place ‘in the name of
reconstruction’ (Simpson 2013: 267)—even when the state
ostensibly does nothing. As the moral imperatives of disaster encourages a major inflow of resources to towns and
villages across the Himalaya, local politics are infused with
new stakes. Opportunities arise for those who happen to
be in the right position or manage to seek that position in
the aftermath. Others might be bypassed by the new trails
of development or fall between the cracks of compensation
schemes. Disparate factors such as religion, occupation,
education, language skills and social networks—even local62 | HIMALAYA Fall 2017

ity during an earthquake—can affect this. As scholars and
interested observers of Nepal and the Himalaya, we need
to pay close attention to these processes and their potentially unequal outcomes in the years to come.
In high Himalayan places such as northern Gorkha District,
the aftershock of disaster is interacting with existing
processes of change in multiple, open-ended ways. As
many other ‘poor’ countries across the world, in the past
years Nepal has been betting heavily on tourism as a route
to economic development (GoN 2009, 2010). However,
plummeting tourist numbers after the earthquake are
now highlighting the vulnerability of tourism as a route
to economic development. Over the past decade, the
Manaslu circuit in northern Gorkha has been promoted as
an up-and-coming tourist destination, destined to become
the ‘next Annapurna.’ Nonetheless, locals currently seem
hesitant. In 2015, a total of 2,414 international trekkers
visited the area, down from 5,918 the year before. Will the
numbers go up again? Furthermore, while infrastructural
development—roads and dams—were a cornerstone of
Nepali developmental imaginaries even before the earthquake, the aftershock has, if anything, reinforced this
focus. However, as illustrated by recent years’ developments in Annapurna, the extension of road networks deep
into and across the Himalayan range can run counter to
the promotion of eco-nature and trekking tourism. In the
meantime, the young people who are currently working
well-paid jobs in the reconstruction industry may be out of
work soon again, when the funds dry up and the spotlight
moves elsewhere. What will be their position when this
happens?
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